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Although the Constellation Program has been redirected, the 
concepts and practices for the Ares 1 and Ares V vehicles are 
still valid for application to future crew launch vehicle and 
heavy launch vehicle designs
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• In the past, space vehicle designers focused on performance. 
• Lessons learned from the Space Shuttle and other launch vehicles 
showed the need to optimize launch vehicles for other system 
parameters (reliability, safety, cost, availability, etc.) besides 
performance.
• These lessons learned have forced a paradigm change on how to 
design and build new launch vehicles.
• This paradigm change created  a risk informed design environment 
which led to an early involvement of S&MA  in the design process.
The Paradigm Change
5The S&MA Functional Roles Change
- In the past, S&MA was tasked mainly to do the assurance function:  Making certain that 
specified activities performed by others are performed in accordance with specified 
requirements. (Upper stage Engine and First Stage). Examples of the activities include:
• Assess Hazard Analyses, FTAs, FMEA/CIL, PRA, etc.
• Approving Material Review Board (MRB) dispositions.
• Performing government inspections, audits, and surveillance.
• Independent assessments.
• Evaluating engineering and manufacturing changes, or proposed variances 
(adaptations, deviations, and waivers), for impacts to safety, reliability, and/or quality
• Evaluating the disposition of problems, including corrective actions (e.g., PRACA 
problem reports)
- Currently, in addition to its assurance function, S&MA is tasked to do an in-line function: 
Under the in-line function, S&MA activities are performed in direct support of the program/project 
to ensure that the program/project will achieve its objectives (Upper Stage and Vehicle 
Integration). Examples of the activities include:
• Establish and implement S&MA programmatic and technical requirements.
• Perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments, Reliability Analysis, Integrated System 
Failure Analysis,  Hazard Analyses, Fault Tree Analyses, FMEA/CIL, etc.
• Develop S&MA plans and methodologies.
• Establish and implement Industrial Safety.
S&MA leading the Integrated Reliability and Safety Analysis
(Example)
The S&MA Operating Environment  Change
7The S&MA Early involvement in the 
Ares I design process
• Example of S&MA involvement in the Ares I Design
– Influenced the choice of the solution to the Thrust Oscillation issue.  Jointly working 
with engineering and Ares I project, S&MA assessed the reliability, quality and safety 
impacts of the various design solutions to the thrust oscillation issue. 
– Influenced the design solution to the First Stage-Upper Stage separation issue.  Jointly 
working with engineering and Ares I project, S&MA assessed the reliability and safety 
impacts of the various design solutions to the First Stage-Upper Stage separation 
issue. 
– Influenced the change of Linear Shape Charge (LSC) initiation timers from percussion 
to Flexible Confined Detonation Cord initiated timers (Flight Termination System)
– Recommended pressurization line be moved out of cable tray to reduce risk to LSC 
and avionics  (upper Stage)
– Optimized valve design for reliability and safety for LH2 and LO2 pressurization.
– Identified issue with use of KC fittings in safety-critical applications and approach to 
qualifying fittings as providing two seals (upper Stage)
The Ares V/EDS Conceptual Phase LOM
Assessment
The Ares V Conceptual Phase LOM Assessment
• The S&MA lessons learned from Ares I were used to 
effectively support the Ares V conceptual design phase and 
help in planning for post conceptual phases.
• The following set of charts contains a summary of the Ares 
V/EDS LOM risk assessment. 
6/14/2010
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Note: The  following information are intended to share the LOM methodology 
and approach used during the conceptual design phase of Ares V and not 
meant to present the up-to-date absolute LOM numbers. 
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Traceability to the NASA’s Exploration System 
Architecture Study (ESAS)
LCCR BASELINE 
57.00.XX
10 m OML
Booster Options
Original ESAS Capability
8.4 m OML
46.0 MT Lander
20.0 MT CEV
No Loiter in LEO
TLI total ∆v = 10,235 ft/sec
7.4 MT TLI perf. reserve
73.4 MT CaLV gross payload 
at TLI capability
Change to RS68 Core 
Engines
10 m dia. Core
490K Fvac to 750k Fvac
452.1 Ispv to 414.7 Ispv
FSB Propellant change from 
HTPB to PBAN (Ares I 53-
06 thrust trace)
IDAC 3 Trade Space
SRM Propellant
Stage Materials
Extra Strapons
Engine Type
10+ m dia. Core
Number of Stages
Shroud Material
Shroud Size
Diameter Change
10 m dia. Core, EDS, and 
Shroud
2005 2006 2007 2008
1 in 125
1 in 100
1 in 75
1 in 50
The Ares V System Baseline Overview
  
 
 
    
   
   
 
  
    
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
    
 
EDS Stage 
Propellants
Usable Propellant
Propellant Offload
Stage liftoff pmf
Launch Dry Mass
TLI Burnout Mass
Suborbital Burn Propellant
Pre-TLI Jettison Mass
LEO FPR
# Engines / Type
Engine Thrust (100%)
Engine Isp (100%)
Mission Power Level
Suborbital Burn Time
TLI Burn Time
4 day LEO loiter
LOX/LH2
557,878 lbm
0.0 %
0.8828
52,912 lbm
58,194 lbm
330,000 lbm
7,344 lbm
8,553 lbm
1 / J-2X
294,000 lbf / 238,000 lbf @ Vac
448.0 sec / 449.0 sec @ Vac
100.0 % / 81.0 %
502.9 sec
429.9 sec
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
          
            
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
     
  
   
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
   
   
 
  
    
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
    
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
      
    
 
 
 
  
Core Stage
Propellants
Usable Propellant
Propellant Offload
Stage pmf
Dry Mass
Burnout Mass
# Engines / Type
Engine Thrust (108%)
Engine Isp (108%)
Mission Power Level
Core Burn Time
LOX/LH2
3,499,458 lbm
0.0 %
0.9014
346,978 lbm
382,958 lbm
6 / RS-68
702,055 lbf @ SL       
364.9 sec @ SL         
108.0 %
303.1 sec
 
 
    
 
 
 
     
  
   
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
  
   
 
  
GLOW
Payload Envelope L x D
Shroud Jettison Mass
8,156,803 lbf
25.3 ft x 30.0 ft
19,953 lbm
 
 
 
 
   
    
    
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
      
    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
          
            
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
     
  
   
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
Altair Lunar Lander
Interstage
J–2X
Loiter Skirt
Payload Adapter
Payload Shroud
PBAN (ATK-333-07 Trace)
1,510,421 lbm
0.8656
234,514 lbm
2 / 5.5 Segment SRM
3,744,000 lbf @ Vac
275.7 sec @ Vac
116.4 sec
  
    
  
 
    
 
Booster (each)
Propellants
Overboard Propellant
Stage pmf
Burnout Mass
# Boosters / Type
Booster Thrust (@ 1.0 secs)
Booster Isp (@ 1.0 secs)
Burn Time
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Methodology
• Building on ESAS Analysis: with similar analysis methodology but 
Ares focused.
• Models use:
• Physics-informed parametric algorithms.
• Vehicle and system heritage data.
• Expert solicitation and engineering judgment.
• Models are designed to interface with performance 
analysis output.
Methodology
Functional/System Breakdown 
Ares V/EDS Operational Timelines
Ares/EDS Ascent Phase
14
The Ares V/EDS Operational Timelines
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The Ares V/EDS Operational Timelines
16
LOM Results Across the Mission Profile
17
LOM across the time line is  Approx.  1/67
EDS LOM is approx. 1/240
LOM Results
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A Major Design Change
• One of the main changes made to the original LCCR EDS design is the 
replacement of the Solar Arrays with Fuel Cells which are jettisoned 
along with the Loiter skirt prior to the TLI burn.
• With an expected improvement in reliability
19
Achievability Assessment
♦ The Ares V LOM Requirement: Ares V shall limit their contribution to 
the risk of Loss of Mission (LOM) for Lunar missions to no greater 
than 1 in 125. Applicability:  Ares V as stated in the requirement has 
been assumed to mean the basic launch vehicle (Core Stage, First 
Stage Booster, RS-68 Engines, necessary guidance and control, etc.) 
performing ascent to EDS separation.
• Achievability:
– The LOM assessment showed that achievability may be a challenge, particularly 
with a configuration of 6 RS-68 engines having no engine-out capability.
♦ The EDS LOM Requirement: Ares V EDS shall limit their 
contribution to the risk of Loss of Mission (LOM) for Lunar missions to 
no greater than 1 in 250.
• Achievability:
– The LOM assessment showed that the EDS shows promise of being able to 
meet the requirement.
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Post conceptual Phase - Reliability Discussions
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Post Conceptual Design Phase
• During conceptual design phase:
– Probabilistic risk Assessment (PRA) is intended to support the 
system configuration selection, functional analysis is used, and basic 
events are at the box level (e.g. loss of propulsion due to SRB, SRM, 
J2-X, etc.)
• In Post conceptual design phases:
– PRA is intended to support component and system design
– The standard PRA methodology is applied.
– Issues are identified and more in-depth analysis are performed.
– Extensive reliability effort is planned to support the Ares V subsystem 
and component design. 
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Operational Reliability
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Design Reliability
Operational
Reliability
Process Reliability
Processing Models
Processing
Process 
CharacterizationProcess Control
Manufacturing Models
Materials Properties
Material Models
Loads
Historical data and models
Loads &
Environments
Operating conditions
Operations
Design Reliability
Design Process Materials 
Production
•Loads
•Environments
•Usage
•Sizing
•Materials
•Geometry
Operating 
Stress
•Acceptance 
Testing
•Qualification 
Testing
Baseline Material 
Strength
Operating Stress Material Strength
Probability of Failure24
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Process Reliability
Concluding Remarks
• The lessons learned from the S&MA early involvement in the Ares I launch vehicle 
design phases proved that performing an in-line function jointly with engineering 
is critical for S&MA to have an effective role in supporting the system, element, 
and component design. 
• These lessons learned were used to effectively support the Ares V conceptual 
design phase and planning for post conceptual design phases. 
• The Top level Conceptual LOM assessment for Ares V performed by the S&MA 
community jointly with the engineering Advanced Concept Office (ACO) was 
influential in the final selection of the Ares V system configuration. 
• Post conceptual phase, extensive reliability effort should be planned to support 
future Heavy Lift Launch Vehicles (HLLV) design. In-depth reliability analysis 
involving the design, manufacturing, and system engineering communities is 
critical to understand design and process uncertainties and system integrated 
failures. 
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